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Abstract
This paper explains the causes of financial underdevelopment 
in Georgia shedding light on country’s prolonged ethnic and civil 
conflict. It is argued that newly privatized commercial banks are 
excessively cautious in expanding their loan assets to private non-
financial corporations due mainly to the lack of banks’ skill and 
capacity of monitoring credit and political risk. Lending activity is 
associated with uncertainty stemming from recurrent civil war 
which has prevented banks from precisely assessing borrower’s 
credit risk. Further support to this proposition is provided 
drawing upon Sri Lankan experience that shows that bank 
responds positively to loan demand during the time of ceasefire 
and the vice-versa.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Georgia’s two secessionist states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have 
not only been the centre of civil and political unrest but also the pieces of 
discord between Georgia and its largest and mighty neighbor, Russia. In 
August 2008, Russia attacked Georgia from its military base on South Os-
setia, where majority inhabitants are Russian citizen. This not only has 
led Georgia-Russia relation to a new level of crisis but Georgian territorial 
integrity has also brought into the question.
Georgia emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1990, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, a leading dissident, became the head of the Supreme 
Council of the Republic of Georgia by an impartial election. He then called 
for a referendum on independence in 1991 which was approved by an un-
precedented majority voting. Following this event Soviet Union declared 
formal independence. Gamsakhurdia became the first president of the Re-
public of Georgia. He was dethroned by the armed opposition groups 
through a violent military coup d’état in 1992. This brought Eduard Shev-
ardnadze to become the second president of Georgia. Soon after he as-
sumed power, a separatist dispute ensued in Abkhazia which resulted a vi-
olent fighting between government forces and Abkhaz rebels. This was 
ended up with the expulsion of government forces as well as the entire 
Georgian population out of the region. Government humiliation in Abk-
hazia indirectly escalated ethnic violence in the South Ossetia. At its 
worse, the control of the only autonomous region, Adjara, was slipped to 
anti-government group.
This characterizes the initial few years of Georgia after the independ-
ence. Industrial output contracted sharply as a result (IMF, 2006). Infla-
tion soared to incredibly high level leading to total macroeconomic insta-
bility. Nevertheless, the economy registered a strong rebound in the mid-
1990s overcoming some of these setbacks but the growth was further 
halted by Russian crisis in 1998. Since 2001, macroeconomic stability was 
partially restored which have facilitated the economy to grow modestly. 
This growth momentum has further accelerated by reform initiatives un-
dertaken after the Rose Revolution. In sum, the country has been enjoying 
a modest growth since 2001.
Despite its laudable economic stance, Georgian formal financial sys-
tem is grossly underdeveloped. This goes against a strongly supported 
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proposition that a country’s economic development is followed by a well 
developed, efficient and robust financial system (King and Levin 1993, Ar-
estis and Demetriades 1997, Levin 2002, Beck and Levin 2004). In this pa-
per, we explore this anomaly, first, explaining the driving forces of GDP 
growth and second, pointing out obstacles towards financial development. 
We argue that the frequent civil and ethnic conflicts that result in high 
level of uncertainty are proximate causes of shallow financial development 
in Georgia. Newly privatized commercial banks are excessively cautious in 
expanding their loan assets to private non-financial corporations due 
mainly to the lack of banking skills and capacity to asses and monitor 
credit and political risk. As a result, the ratio of bank loan to GDP is lag-
ging far behind compared to other transitional economies in the Caucasus. 
This becomes a paradox if we take into consideration the fact that banks 
enjoy huge spread margin on lending and the share of nonperforming 
loans (NPL) to total loans is miniscule. We attempt to unfold this paradox 
stating that a continuous civil war has prevented banks to precisely assess 
risks which are embedded not only with corporations but also with the 
country’s political environment. We draw upon the experience of Sri 
Lankan financial system in the light of its prolonged civil war. It shows 
that during the ceasefire between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) 
and the government of Sri Lanka, bank loans increased substantially with 
an expansion of branch network and financial activities.
This paper organized as section two enumerates a brief account of the 
economic performance of Georgia. In section three, we show the level of 
country’s financial deepening using different measures. Section four points 
out reasons of shallow financial system putting special emphasis on the 
civil war whereas section five concentrates on Sri Lankan experience 
which is followed by a brief conclusion.
2. A BRIEF MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
The Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (SSRG) was one of the most 
prosperous areas in the former Soviet Union. However, the country lost its 
growth pace in the period of transition from SSRG to Republic of Georgia. 
Cumulative decline in real GDP was estimated to be more than 70 percent 
between 1990 and 1994, and by the end of 1996, Georgia’s economy had 
shrunk to around one-third of its size in 1989 (Djugeli and Chantladze, 
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1999). GDP grew by 2 percent in 1995 (figure 1) to a total of US $1.90 billion 
(at current price) which increased almost double to US $3.62 billion in 1998 
before Russian financial crisis further halted the momentum.1) As a result of 
this crisis, Georgian GDP, again, contracted to US $2.80 billion in 1999.2)
However, the GDP growth rate has increased from 2 percent in 2000 
to a new peak of 11 percent in 2003 before the civil unrest erupted against 
the Shevardnadze government. The unrest slowed GDP growth rate down 
to 6 percent. Since then, various reform activities were initiated by the 
subsequent governments. The GDP growth rate averaged 10 percent from 
2004 to 2007, higher than the average growth rate witnessed by Common-
wealth of Independent States (“CIS”) from 2002 to 2006 (7 percent). This 
provides with the evidence that Georgian economy has been enjoying an 
impressive GDP growth since the time of Rose Revolution. 
The economy is traditionally agriculture dominated. In 1996, agricul-
tural value added to GDP accounted for more than one third (34 percent) 
while the industrial contribution remained as low as 24 percent. The re-
maining 42 percent was contributed by service sector. However, the contri-
bution of agriculture to GDP has declined to 14 percent between 1996 and 
2006. Despite the fact that industrial contribution to GDP has been rising 
 1)  For more detail on Russian crisis see Gonzalo Pastor and Tatiana Damjanovic (2001). The 
Russian Financial Crisis and its Consequences for Central Asia, IMF Working Paper no 
WP/01/169
 2) International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008
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Figure 1: GDP growth rate of Georgia from 1995-2006
Source: World Development Indicators
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since the year 2000, the growth pace is rather trivial. For instance, be-
tween 2000 and 2005, contribution to GDP of this sector increased merely 
by 6 percent. In contrast, service sector’s contribution reached to a new 
peak of 62 percent in 2006. This implies that the declining share of agri-
culture is compensated by service sector while industrial sector remains 
significantly unchanged.
Figure 2 shows the growth pattern of some selected indicators that 
are the drivers of Georgian economic growth in the recent years. Manufac-
turing sector grew by 178 percent from GEL 517 million in 2000 to GEL 
1435 million in 2007.3) However, major thrust of growth came mainly from 
construction, public administration, defense, and trade. Construction ac-
tivities accounted for 6.8 percent of the total GDP in 2003 amounting to 
GEL 547 million which rose to GEL 938 million in 2005. Such a tremen-
dous rise of construction work in that particular period can be attributed 
to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project. From the commence-
ment of the project, a total investment of US $514.67 million was budgeted 
for the Georgian section of 249 kilometers (Papava, 2005a). As a result, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to Georgia jumped from US $492.33 
million in 2004 to US $1059.8 million in the 2006, an increase of more 
than double (Figure 3). Moreover, almost one third of the total FDI inflow 
during 2006 was directed to the pipeline construction.
 3) GEL, Georgian Lari, is the national currency of Georgia
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Figure 2: Growth pattern of some selected indicators (Year 2000=100)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Georgia.
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Another major component that experienced an overwhelming increase 
since 2003 is the government expenditure for public administration and 
defense. Such increase can be attributed to Georgia’s radical turn from 
pro-Russian to pro-western policies for territorial security. This was the 
fundamental impetus for modernization of Georgia’s defense that gave rise 
to the overwhelming increase in budget allocation. The large expenditure 
increase was met primarily by revenue collected from privatization. The 
proceeds from privatization amounted to GEL 23.6 million in 2003 which 
skyrocketed to GEL 564.5 million at the end of 2006. However, the most 
important source of finance was the government debt from National Bank 
of Georgia (“NBG”) and external sources. Foreign debt accounts for the 
largest share of public debt. In 2007, debt amounted to GEL 3920 million 
down from GEL 4076 million in 2004, of which domestic debt constituted 
only one third and the remaining was financed by foreign debt.4) This sce-
nario shows that the growth drivers of Georgian economy such as public 
spending and construction relied more on external sources of finance in-
cluding foreign debt, FDI inflow etc. without requiring financing needs 
from the formal financial system of the country. As a result financial sec-
tor remains shallow while economic growth is on the rise.
 4)  The declining trend of foreign debt from 2003 to 2006 (figure 3) can be attributed to the 
consequence of a debt restructuring agreement in July 2004 with Paris Club countries 
(Kraan and Bergvall, 2006).
 5)  External debt was originally reported in US $. The dollar amount is converted to Lari mul-
tiplying by the official exchange rate of GEL to dollar (which was 2:1 over the reported pe-
riod) for easy comparability with other data.
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Figure 3: Foreign direct investment and external debt5)
Source: WDI and NBG 
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3. FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN GEORGIA
Georgia’s financial system comprises of 19 commercial banks of which 
14 are foreign controlled, 24 non-bank depository corporations, 15 micro fi-
nance organizations, one stock exchange, 15 insurance companies, and 3 
pension funds.6) Contribution of non-depository corporations, insurance 
companies and pension funds to the aggregate financial system is trivial. 
Country’s only stock market, Georgian Stock Exchange (GSE) still re-
mains small; market capitalization to GDP remained as low as 12 percent 
in 2007 which implies that the stock market provides only a limited finan-
cial support to the economy and thus, banking sector should cater entre-
preneur’s financial needs.
The Law on the National Bank of Georgia passed in 1991 to establish 
NBG as the central bank bestowing the supervisory, regulatory, and mone-
tary power. In the early years of Georgian reform, two major approaches to 
the transformation of banking system were followed: encouraging new en-
try by formation of new private banks and rehabilitation of existing banks 
by emphasizing on gradual transformation of former state-owned banks. 
In order to achieve the first objective licensing requirements for establish-
ing private banks were eased (Gurgenidze, 1995). Moreover, minimum cap-
ital requirements were set very low. When the coupon was introduced in 
August 1993, the minimum capital requirement was 500 million coupons 
equivalent to US $700,000. A year later the requirement’s real value had 
shrunk only equivalent to US $500 (Kloc, 1999). As a result, the number of 
banks in the country skyrocketed from 7 in 1991 to 226 in 1994. This ex-
pansion however, was not accompanied by financial deepening. At the end 
of 1995, total credit to GDP remained below 10 percent. Firms that needed 
substantial bank financing started to open their own banks.
As such, the qualitative improvement of banking operation remained 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, such euphoric expansion without a broad base of 
depositors and borrowers might lead to banking sector collapse. To curtail 
this possibility, the NBG and the government began a number of policies 
designed to improve bank safety and efficiency. Noteworthy among them 
were complete stop of issuing licenses for the establishment of new banks. 
Capital adequacy ratio was raised from 5 percent to 8 percent and the min-
 6) As of 31
st
 December, 2007 
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imum capital requirement increased to $100,000. These changes caused 
the number of banks to drop from 226 in 1994 to101 in the following year.
Besides tightening regulations, the government also concentrated on re-
structuring state-owned commercial banks. Five state-owned commercial 
banks which were formed out of the Georgian branches of five specialized 
banks of the former Soviet Union were fully privatized from 1993 to 1995. 
Another stage of reforms was executed in 1997 by announcing a plan to 
gradually increase the minimum capital requirement for commercial banks 
to GEL 5 million by the end of 2000. This measure was targeted to consoli-
date the industry by eliminating the smaller and weaker banks either by de-
licensing or encouraging them to merge together. Such a policy was believed 
to open a window for foreign banks to expand their operations in Georgia.
Throughout 1998 the NBG was involved in revoking licenses of banks 
not meeting the new minimum capital requirements and other prudential 
regulations. By the end of the year, a total of 10 banks had lost their li-
censes and the trend continued year by year basis. At the end of 2006, the 
number of commercial banks had dropped to the record low, 17 banks. Fur-
thermore, new accounting rules consistent with international accounting 
standards were introduced in 1999. Minimum capital adequacy require-
ments were increased from 10 to 15 percent of total assets. On the other 
hand, banks were required to provide external audits performed by inter-
national auditors after February 1999.
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Figure 4: Financial system indicators (% of GDP)
Source: National Bank of Georgia, and WDI
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Despite the sweeping reform of banking sector, overall financial sys-
tem in Georgia is still underdeveloped. For instance, broad monetary sup-
ply (M2) of Georgia remains below 20 percent of GDP (figure 4). Transition 
economies such as Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyz Republic 
share a higher percentage of M2 to GDP than Georgia. This suggests that 
there is enormous room for commercial banks to increase their lending ac-
tivities without causing significant overheating of the financial market. 
However, until 2004 the ratio of bank loans to GDP remained extremely 
low, below 10 percent. After the Rose Revolution, the percentage has in-
creased constituting roughly 28 percent of GDP. Similar pattern is fol-
lowed for deposits. Deposit base was very small representing only 10 per-
cent of the GDP at the end of 2005 which increased merely to 17 percent 
at the end of 2007. Commercial banks’ total assets amounted to GEL 1391 
million at the time of Rose Revolution which increased to GEL 8835.1 mil-
lion at the end of June 2008. However, no significant change in the compo-
sition of bank assets has taken place. The percentage of total bank assets 
held in loans constituted roughly half of the total bank assets at the end of 
2001 which increased to 63 percent as of September, 2008. Thus, in any 
measure Georgian financial system is still at its infancy.   
4. OBSTACLES TOWARDS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Financial sector development depends on many important determi-
nants which might be interrelated and complementary to each other. Cru-
cial drivers of financial development include credit infrastructure that fa-
cilitates easy availability of creditor’s information, legal infrastructures; 
and macro-economic stability that restrains the rate of inflation, govern-
ment budget deficit, and exchange rate fluctuations (Claessens and Feijen, 
2006). Because developing countries are lacking efficient credit infrastruc-
ture and other related laws, financial intermediaries emerge as a result. 
Suzuki et al. (2008:57) argue
In the developing countries where the asymmetry of information is 
widespread and individual investors have limited capacity to absorb 
risks and uncertainty, banks step forward to overcome those problems 
and ensure sound and smooth flow of financial intermediation. Moreo-
ver, through accumulating knowledge and skills, banks provide disci-
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pline in the markets in that they ensure the high quality borrowers’ 
not only access to the necessary funds but also at relatively lower 
costs.
In this sense, lack of credit infrastructure partially explains financial 
underdevelopment in Georgia but the argument is not sufficient in its 
own. It is true that capital market in Georgia is still in its embryonic 
stage; however, smooth financial intermediation can take place without 
buoyant capital market. Bank-centered financial system in Japan and 
Germany is the case in point.
The basic incentive for banks to assume borrowers’ credit risk is the 
magnitude of spread margin banks earn on lending. Even though it is un-
likely that larger spread margin would always be accompanied by higher 
level of lending7), a certain level of ‘bank-rent’ is necessary for individual 
banks to operate as long-run agents so that they may work to monitor bor-
rowers effectively. The prospective benefits from monitoring efforts that a 
bank must earn is crucial to preserve its ‘franchise value’ (Hellmann et al., 
1997: 171–174) and ‘reputation’ (Stiglitz 1994: 223) as intangible assets for 
ensuring good credit risk management and efficient monitoring (Suzuki 
2005, 2006). Despite the existence of handsome bank spread margin in 
Georgia, bank lending activities has not been increased accordingly.
We find an interesting relationship between bank lending and inter-
est spread margin. Banks’ lending to private sector increased from 3 per-
cent of GDP in 1996 to around 8 percent in 2000 whereas spread margin 
declined from 37 percent in 1997 to 20 percent in 2001 (figure 5). From 
2000 to 2004, banks’ lending to GDP ratio remained stagnant and the in-
terest spread remained constant. Again, we observe an inverse relation-
ship between interest spread and bank’s lending. While spread margin de-
clined from 24 percent in 2004 to 7.3 percent in 2007, banks’ lending to the 
economy more than doubled at the same time. This paradox can be attrib-
uted to the fact that when uncertainty was high, caused by civil war, 
banks charged extensively high interest rate on lending which was fol-
lowed by the low level of lending activities. Conversely, in a relatively 
peaceful time, bank charged low interest rate owing to reduced uncertain-
ty which triggered the demand for loan. This yields an inverse relationship 
 7)  Because in a market with imperfect information, credit is rationed i.e., higher interest rate 
on loan cannot stimulate bank’s increased lending, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
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between interest spread margin and credit expansion. However, this prop-
osition may not be true in the case of state-owned banks where govern-
ment can repress lending and deposit rates through direct intervention in 
the credit market. Nevertheless, in Georgia, commercial banks are pri-
vately owned. 
4.1. The time of trouble (1991-1994)
The genesis of conflict between breakaways and Georgia is somehow, 
unfortunately though, inherited from the crisis of Soviet Communism that 
paved the way for eventual breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
breakup generated some independent states like Georgia with minimal or 
no state capacity. As a consequence, they have failed to maintain the terri-
torial integrity on their own. This weakness of Tbilisi has helped Abkhaz-
ians and South Ossetians to form a different mindset which Nodia 
(2005:51) calls the ‘national project’-
We are not Georgians. We are the only autochthonous population on 
the territory that we occupy. Other groups, including Georgians, who 
live on this territory, are guests (migrants) or, worse, ‘occupiers.’ The 
territory where we live is not Georgian and should be separate from 
Georgia. Uniting with our brethren in the North Caucasus is highly 
desirable 
0.00
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
20.00 
25.00 
30.00 
35.00 
40.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Interest spread margin (in %) Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 
Figure 5: Bank interest spread, and credit to private sector
Source: WDI and National Bank of Georgia
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According to 1989 census, 45.7 percent of total 525,000 people living 
in Abkhazia was Georgian, 17.8 percent Abkhaz, 14.3 percent Russians, 
and 14.6 percent Armenians. In South Ossetia, Georgian constituted only 
29 percent of its total 100,000 inhabitants whereas 66.2 percent was Osse-
tian (Zurcher, 2005). This diversity in population is the primary source of 
nationalist movement in these two breakaways.
The nationalist movement in South Ossetia began when Georgia 
passed a Language Law in August 1989. South Ossetia protested this 
move by promulgating Ossetian as its official language. Moreover, South 
Ossetian Regional Soviet appealed to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and 
the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to raise the status of South Osse-
tia from autonomous region to autonomous republic. As a counter meas-
ure, around 30,000 Georgians demonstrated in the Ossetian capital, 
Tskhinvali, in November 1989. They were obstructed by Soviet security 
force which resulted in a clash. This was just the beginning.
Amidst the preparation of Georgian first parliamentary election in 
1990, a law was enacted prohibiting local political party to take part in the 
election. In retaliation, local groups active in South Ossetia proclaimed the 
independence of South Ossetia. They further asked Moscow to allow acced-
ing to the Soviet Union (Zurcher, 2005). In December 1990, South Ossetia 
held its own parliamentary election which was declared illegitimate by 
newly formed Georgian Parliament. Furthermore, Georgia abrogated au-
tonomous status of South Ossetia. In the early of January 1991, Georgian 
troops occupied South Ossetia and seized Tskhinvali. South Ossetian mili-
tants resisted fiercely. This confrontation ended with the massacre of civil-
ians, looting and burning of Ossetian communities. The war lasted until 
1992, when peacekeepers entered the territory in compliance with a four-
party agreement (Russia, Georgia, Northern and South Ossetia). Around 
1,100 people died during 1991-1992 war (Mukomel, 2001:24) and 40 per-
cent of Georgian living in South Ossetia left the region; approximately 
30,000 Ossetians living in Georgia displaced to North Ossetia.    
The second wave of civil conflict resulting from struggle for national 
power can be traced in August 1991 when the leader of the National 
Guard disobeyed Gamsakhurdia’s order to integrate the Georgian Nation-
al Guard to Soviet Interior Ministry (Zurcher, 2005). As a result, large per-
centage of the troops was withdrawn from Tbilisi and the remaining split 
into pro- and anti-Gamsakhurdia factions. As the tension in Tbilisi inten-
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sified, Gamsakhurdia declared the state of emergency in Georgia. Fighting 
continued between pro- and anti-Gamsakhurdia forces in and around Tbi-
lisi. By the end of December 1991, civil war erupted in full swing in Tbilisi. 
In January 1992, Gamsakhurdia and his entourage flee Tbilisi for exile af-
ter his troops are defeated in street battles.
In March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze was named the head of a new 
Georgian State Council and entrusted him to resolve the ongoing civil cri-
sis. Meanwhile, agitation by pro-Gamsakhurida elements continued, espe-
cially in western Georgia and they gained control on Abkhazia. Moreover, 
the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet voted to restore the 1921 constitution which 
declares the region to be a union republic separate from Georgia. As was 
expected, Georgia clearly denounced such a move and condemned the res-
toration of the Abkhaz constitution. 
This was the hotbed to escalate the war between Abkhaz and Geor-
gians in Abkhazia, a third wave of major violence within first two years of 
independence. In the mid of September 1993, Abkhaz rebels launched a 
surprise assault on Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. Georgian forces, 
therefore, were threatened from the two fronts: in the North by the Abk-
haz rebels and in the South by the Gamsakhurdia’s forces. Sukhumi was 
recaptured by Abkhaz forces that yielded them effective control over most 
of the region. This defeat of Georgian forces reminded Shevardnadze that 
there is no way out from the crisis unless he establishes good relation with 
Russia. Russia already warned that unless Georgia becomes a member of 
CIS, Russian support will not be available. Shevardnadze finally an-
nounced Georgia’s joining to CIS. The war ended at the end of 1993. Mu-
komel (2001:24) reports that in Abkhazai, the death toll totaled 12,000 
people of the entire conflicting period during 1992-1994. In 1993 alone, 
there were 8,000 people reportedly died in Abkhazia. Furthermore, the 
number of refugees was 130,000 people at the end of 1991, which reached 
to all time high 143,000 at the end of 1992.
During the conflict, Georgia was engulfed by macro-economic instabil-
ity including high level of inflation, tremendous fluctuation in real ex-
change rate, unbalanced fiscal policy, worsening balance of payment. An-
nual rate of inflation soared as high as 9040 percent8) in 1993 and the 
trend continued few more years until it tumbled down to double digit in 
 8) Change of consumer price index from the previous year
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1996. Budget deficit since 1991 has been a common characteristic and the 
resulting rise of central government debt. In such a circumstance, econo-
my suffered from lack of confidence. Depositors could trust neither the na-
tional government nor depository institutions to put their savings. On the 
other hand, bank could not predict the risk involved with borrowers due to 
fuzzy uncertainty of war leading to a very low level of financial intermedi-
ation.
This uncertainty was reflected in interest rate banks charged to even 
very limited number of borrowers. For example, in 1995 the weighted aver-
age rate of interest on national currency loans was as high as 76 percent. 
This means that banks can recover more than three quarters of its loan 
within the course of a year just merely from interest earning. Extremely 
high interest rate was charged not merely for national currency denomi-
nated loans so that bank can guard against inflationary pressure alone, 
but extraordinarily high interest rate (73 percent as of 1995) was charged 
for foreign currency denominated loans as well. This means that banks 
were trying to recover the loans within a shorter pay back period because 
of fuzzy uncertainty entangled with the future.
The secession of ethnic war between 1995 and 1997 brought some pos-
itive effects on the economy in general and financial system in particular. 
For example, bank loans to private sector reached roughly to 9 percent of 
GDP at the end of 1999, an increase of more than double from 1994 while 
the interest spread declined almost to half between 1997 and 1999. Rela-
tively calm situation incentivized banks to expand their loan assets even 
at a lower margin. This trend however, did not last long because of mount-
ing tension again between the central government and the secessionist 
states. The situation turned into turbulent phase once again at the end of 
1998 pressured by both internal and external forces.
Table 1: State fragility, macro-economic stability, and financial deepening
The Time of 
Trouble
(1991-1994)
Frozen Uncer-
tainty
(1998-2003)
Fragile Stabil-
ity (2004-2007 )
State Fragility Index
No. of Refugees 
(average)
127,000 (‘92-‘94) 24,000 30,000
Internally Displaced 
Population (average) 
255,000 (’92-‘94) 270,000 244,000
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State Fragility Index* 13 (end of 1994) 10 (end of 2000) 8 (end of 2007)
Macro-economic Stability
Inflation** 4724 7 8
State budget deficit
(% of GDP)
17 4 1
Central Government 
Debt (% of GDP)
- 64 36
Financial Deepening (all figures are in % of GDP)
Loan to private sector - 8 18
Deposit - 5 12
Monetization - 10 16
Market Capitalization - 3 (2000-2003) 8
Source: constructed based on data: Wellisz (1999), Cukrowski (2000), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank), National Bank of Georgia, Georgian Statistical Yearbook (various 
years), Marshall and Cole (2008), INSCR database
*No fragility ‘0’, Low fragility ‘8’, Medium fragility ‘16’, High fragility ‘24’   
** Figures are averaged for the indicated period after calculating inflation annually  
4.2. Frozen uncertainty (1998-2003)
The second phase of tension started in the summer 1997 when Geor-
gian-Abkhaz relations reached to a new peak of tense. Political scientists 
predicted the resumption of new hostilities (Walker, 2000). In May 1998, 
there was an outbreak of the hostilities in Gali region between Abkhaz 
forces and the White Legion, an irregular force emerged in Georgia alleg-
edly under the patronization of Georgian central authority. This conflict 
led to the devastating “Six Day War” in 1998 (Nodia, 2000). A ceasefire 
was signed on May 30, 1998, but no peace accord has been formulated. The 
standoff remains unsettled as a result.
In 1999, Russia engaged in war against Chechnya asked permission 
from Georgian administration to execute air-strike against Chechnya from 
Russian military base in Georgia. Shevardnadze refused the request. This 
mounted Russian antagonism against Georgia which further worsened 
due to Georgia’s acceptance of Chechens as refugee. Russian diplomatic 
and military pressure on Georgia increased as a result. It is reported that 
there were at least 25 cases of Russian violations of Georgian airspace 
since 1999 until August 2002 (Devdariani, 2005).
Georgia alone was unfit to end the crisis. On the other hand, Georgia 
could not rely on Russian intervention because Russia has definitely failed 
to tackle Chechen issue by its own. This left Georgian option confined to 
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‘look-west’ policy. As expected, Georgia asked for US help. US Department 
of Defense announced a $64 billion Georgia Train and Equip Program 
(GTEP) to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situ-
ation in the Pankisi. Georgian leaders miscalculated the future. US pres-
ence in the Pankisi would help to resolve the problem temporarily but 
would be one step forward to destroy Russia’s trust on Georgia. That is 
what really happened at last. Russia imposed visa requirements for Geor-
gians while the parliament passed a resolution condemning the Status of 
Forces Agreement between US and the Georgia (Antonenko, 2005).
Financial development that was accelerated slightly after temporary 
conclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetian issue was halted substantially 
once again. Banks loan to GDP remained stagnant between the period of 
1999 and 2004 while interest spread margin even increased slightly. Mon-
etization to GDP increased merely by 2 percent from 2000 to 2003. Similar 
trend is noticed in the case of deposit to GDP ratio. However, all of these 
would see a significant rise in the next few years after the Rose Revolution 
that helped restore macroeconomic stability, partially though.
4.3. Fragile stability (Since 2004)
Rose Revolution paved the way for a new presidential election in Jan-
uary 4, 2004 in which Mikhail Saakashvili was elected as president. The 
new government initiated some legal and institutional reforms and was a 
mix of good optimism as well as concern. This was reflected in Saakashvi-
li’s inaugural speech as president “We would like to express our huge grat-
itude to the United States, which helped us in the most difficult times. We 
would like to offer a friendly hand to Russia and develop this friendship”.9) 
Optimism stems from the fact that western philosophy of economic and 
political reforms is likely to bring positive effects. In contrast, the interest 
of US and Russia to Georgia is somewhat conflicting. This is the major 
source of concern for Georgians. The regime we call “fragile stability’.
Saakashvili was more proactive to Russia in order to normalize the 
relationship (Devdariani, 2005). In February 2004, Saakashvili visited 
Moscow and expressed his aspiration to Russian president Vladimir Putin 
 9)  Georgia Has a New President, Civil Georgia, January 25, 2004. URL: http://www.civil.ge 
Civil War and Financial Underdevelopment（SUZUKI & MIAH & WANNIARACHCHIGE）2010】 47
I will tell you frankly, I came here to befriend you. Russia is a great 
power. We, of course, [represent] a small country. But we have our own 
interests, pride and history. We really hope that we will be able, if not 
to settle all [bilateral] issues at once, at least to progressively achieve 
some results.10)
Saakashvili’s main objective was to request Russia to withdraw its 
military base from Georgia. However, until January 2004, negotiations on 
withdrawal of two bases, Batumi and Akhalkalaki, had made no headway. 
Amidst this stalemate, the Georgian Parliament approved a resolution in-
structing the executive government to take measures against the Russian 
military bases currently stationed in Georgia if an agreement over a “rea-
sonable” timeframe for their withdrawal is not reached.11） Finally, Geor-
gian and Russian Foreign Ministers signed a joint communiqué agreeing 
that pullout process will be over during 2008.
This means that even though the fundamental reasons of tension still 
exist, a short-term stability has been achieved. This was followed by macr-
oeconomic stability (table 1). Inflation rate averaged 8 percent for the en-
tire period whereas government budget deficit declined to 1 percent of the 
GDP. Similarly, central government debt reduced substantially to 36 per-
cent. This stability even fragile, created a level of public trust on govern-
ment. As a consequence, credit to private sector has been increasing 
sharply since 2004 despite the rate of interest on lending has been declin-
ing almost at the same pace. Since the fundamental reason of tension has 
not been uprooted yet, it is usual that financial intermediaries would be-
have cautiously amidst expansionary mood. This is reflected in the banks 
preference of lending activities to certain sectors.
Figure 6 shows that four sectors – agriculture, industry, construction, 
and trade – comprise more than 80 percent of the banks’ total claim over 
the years. However, major percentage of total claim is concentrated on 
trade. For instance, at the end of 2002, banks’ claims on trading comprised 
40 percent of the total claims followed by industry (32 percent). While ag-
riculture still remains virtually un-served, bank claims on construction 
 10)  Moscow-Tbilisi: Problems Remain, Despite Cordial Tone, Civil Georgia, February 12, 2004, 
URL: http://www.civil.ge
 11)  Parliament Sets Deadline for Pullout of Russian Military Bases, Civil Georgia, March 10, 
2005URL: http://www.civil.ge
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has been rising in the recent years along with steady rise of trade. In con-
trast, loans to industry as a share of total loans are in decline. At the end 
of September 2008 the respective share of trade, industry, and construc-
tion accounted for 47, 21, and 12 percent. This shows that trade comprises 
almost half of commercial bank’s total claim.
Concentration of bank’s lending on this sector can be attributed to 
various factors. Firstly, trade lending is a sort of short-term lending. By ex-
panding loan on this sector, commercial banks are trying to minimize their 
overall risk portfolio since long-term lending is more risky at least for 
Georgia. Secondly, trade relies substantially on foreign currency which is 
least affected by uncertainty stemming from Georgian civil conflicts. 
Thirdly, as we have argued that trade base of Georgia which was tradition-
ally heavily concentrated on Russia has now expanded to various coun-
tries and regions, which ultimately means the diversification of risk. For-
eign currency denominated loans constitutes three fourth of the total 
loans extended by commercial banks. Moreover, roughly 80 percent of the 
loans on trade are dollar denominated. Since trade of Georgia is substan-
tially related to international trade, there would be no difficulty for bor-
rowers to repay interest and principal in foreign currency.12)Taking the fact 
into consideration that the baking history in Georgia is not old, it can be 
 12)  External trade turnover from January 2008 to August 2008 amounted to US $5.2 billion. 
Export increased from GEL 461.4 million in 2003 to GEL 1232.9 million in 2007  
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Figure 6: Claims of commercial banks on major sectors (in %)
Source: Bulletin of Monetary and Banking Statistics (various years)
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argued that a system of prudence monitoring has not yet evolved. Under 
this circumstance, it is natural for commercial banks to shy away from un-
certainty which is fundamentally related to Georgian macro-economic in-
stability due to civil war.
However, looking the fact from demand-side perspective it appears 
that banks’ lending concentration on trade can be attributed to the low 
level of industrial base in Georgia which in turn leads to a low level of de-
mand for loans. That might be one of the sensible reasons for shallow fi-
nancial system. While it is true that a flourishing industrial sector will in-
flate the demand for loans, the cause-effect relationship is however, 
inconclusive because financial system development and the industrial 
progress can reinforce each other. Naturally, industrial sector, especially at 
the beginning of industrialization of a country, requires credit for relative-
ly longer term since the gestation period of investment is longer than 
trade and other services sectors. In this sense, macroeconomic stability is 
a prerequisite to increase lenders’ confidence so that credit is channeled to 
long-term borrowers. In this sense, it is more reasonable to argue that 
banks prefer short term lending to long-term lending than to argue that 
low level of industrial base compels banks to concentrate on trade. Further 
evidence on the relationship between civil war and financial underdevel-
opment can be derived from Sri Lankan experience. 
5. EVIDENCE FROM SRI LANKA
If civil war inhibits the financial development because of its associat-
ed risk and uncertainty, we should observe a somewhat similar trend in a 
country entrapped with civil war. In this sense, Sri Lanka, which has been 
struggling with prolonged civil strife since 1983, offers an important impli-
cation for our argument although the nature and dimension of civil con-
flict in both countries are not thoroughly alike.
Sri Lankan economy has grown significantly and become more dy-
namic over the past two decades. However, it has fallen short of its real 
growth potential which can be attributed, in major part, to the prolonged 
civil conflict (World Bank, 2000). Continuing civil war is estimated to sup-
press the GDP growth by 2 to 3 percentage points a year (CBSL, 1998) af-
fecting negatively through inefficient allocation of resources, productivity 
losses, destruction of infrastructure, under-utilization of production capac-
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ity and weak investor confidence, along with political instability and hu-
man suffering (CBSL, 2002).
In Sri Lanka, commercial banks continue to dominate the financial 
system, intermediating nearly 46.2 percent of total assets as of 2000, 
which further increased to 48 percent as of 2006. State participation in 
banking system has declined significantly since 1980 even though it still 
remains a major player. Compared to other South Asian countries, Sri 
Lankan equity market is relatively developed comprising more than half 
of the GDP, but corporate bond market is totally thin. This implies that 
private corporations have to rely mostly on banks and to a lesser extent on 
stock market.
Bank credit to private sector is hovering around one third of the GDP 
during the reported period (figure 7). Compared to advanced countries, 
this level of financial intermediation is definitely low. However, commer-
cial bank lending to private sectors has been increasing over the years. 
Specially, a steady rise in the bank’s lending activities followed from 2001 
to 2006. For example, credit to private sector amounted to Rs. 444.4 billion 
in 2002 which increased to Rs. 993.2 billion in 2006, a cumulative rise of 
almost 124 percent. Although it would be irrational to attribute any single 
factor to this sharp rise in commercial banks’ lending activities, the Cease-
fire Agreement (CFA) in 2002 is one, but crucial among many other insti-
tutional reforms that Sri Lankan government has initiated at the begin-
ning of new millennium.
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The CFA was signed in 2002 and lasted officially until January, 2008. 
It was the result of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2001 be-
tween LTTE and the government which led to the longest period of ‘no 
war’ or ‘negative peace’ since 1980s (Podder 2006, Crisis Group 2006, Fair 
2006). Despite the fact that LTTE refused in several occasions between 
2003 and 2006 to participate in the negotiations with the government 
(Crisis Group 2006, Podder 2006), the ongoing peace efforts, with strong 
and wider domestic and international support, have created optimism 
with regard to finding a lasting solution (CBSL, 2001). Thus, the peace 
talks fostered a sense of optimism about a possible end to the civil war 
(Fair, 2006). The effectiveness of CFA however, was not confined merely to 
optimism; it had an impact in the real life as well. For example, the 
number of causalities reduced tremendously during the time when CFA 
was in effect. Death toll from the war causalities dramatically reduced to 
15 in 2002 compared to 1822 in 2001 and 3791 in 2000. Such a low level of 
causality prevailed until 2005 before finally it bounced back to previous 
level in 2006. Along with credit expansion, currency circulation has also 
increased by an average 15 percent during the period of 2002-2006 which 
the CBSL (2002) attributes to recovery of the economic activity, especially 
in the conflicting region.
Accelerated economic activity combined with the improved political 
condition resulted in motivation for banks to undertake more investment 
opportunities. Investment of the banking sector increased by 32.3 percent 
in 2002 and 25.8 percent in 2003 compared to 13.7 percent growth in 2001. 
Following the growth in investment, the risk weighted assets increased by 
30 percent in 2003 compared to 3 percent growth in 2002 and 0.1 percent 
in 2001. As a result, return on assets of commercial banks gradually in-
creased to 1.8 percent in 2006 compared to 1.1 percent in 2001(CBSL, 
2007). Furthermore, the foreign currency deposits have been almost dou-
bled between 2001 and 2002 due to increased confidence in the domestic 
economy. Net Foreign Assets (NFA) has been increased by 58.9 percent in 
2002 compared to 9.2 percent increase in 2001. The main reasons behind 
this increase is the improvement of NFA held by the CBSL with the im-
provement in Balance of Payment, inflows to the stock market, growth in 
Non Resident Foreign Currency (NRFC) deposits and the return of war 
risk deposits placed abroad by the government in the light of improved po-
litical stability. At the same time, foreign investment became net inflow in 
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2002, which were net outflows since 1998 for four consecutive years. All 
Share Price Index rose at a percentage of 61.3 and 45.2 respectively in 
2003 and 2004 compared to 31 percent in 2002 revealing the positive re-
sponse of the Colombo Stock Exchange to the improved political condition 
and investor confidence. In this sense it can logically be argued that the 
CFA helped restoring macroeconomic stability with increased confidence 
which in turn influenced the spontaneous rise in economic activity and the 
resulting credit expansion.
One point worth mentioning here is that the removal of the war risk 
insurance premium, which was in effect since 2001 due to increased secu-
rity threats, facilitated recovery in port services and external trade in 
2002 (CBSL, 2002). The decreased defense expenditure has contributed to 
lower the budget deficit by 2 percentage points in 2002 which hence have 
a positive influence on macroeconomic stability through reduction of the 
inflation and government debt. This macroeconomic stability along with 
the increased economic activity has led to the reduction of National Secu-
rity Levy rate from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent. This in turn helped reduc-
ing effective lending rates of commercial banks. For instance, figure 7 
shows the abrupt rise of spread margin from 5.6 percent in 1999 to 8.36 
percent in 2001 which can be attributed to the change of exchange rate re-
gime from fixed to floating system. However, the rate rebounded to 1999 
level in 2002 when CFA was accomplished and remained below 5 percent 
-
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in almost the entire period of CFA.
With the increased confidence of the economic condition and increased 
economic activity in most of the areas in Sri Lanka, the banks started 
spreading. It can be observed in figure 8 that the expansion of branch net-
work has been significantly improved in 2005. It is obvious that the delay 
from 2002 to 2005 for the expansion actually happen to be a reasonable 
time for the banks to evaluate possible risk and make expansion decisions. 
However, the expansion has mainly occurred in the areas other than the 
conflicting region. This can be attributed to the decreased violence in the 
capital city and other regions. Even though the expansion is not dramatic 
in the conflicting region, it has achieved a remarkable growth, indeed, 
compared to past few decades. From this perspective, it can be concluded 
that ceasefire agreement had facilitated financial deepening in Sri Lanka. 
6. CONCLUSION
The critical factor hindering financial development in Georgia can be 
attributed to the lack of macroeconomic stability caused by continuous 
ethnic violence and civil unrest. Initial few years after independence were 
really the turbulent times because of two separatist movements. Obvious-
ly, a newly independent state did not have the capability to absorb such a 
tremendous burden of war. As a consequence, inflation soared to several 
thousands percent. Economic growth that was staged before independence 
halted completely. Once the deep crisis was over, economy regained its 
force. Credit to private sectors surged since the Rose Revolution. But the 
question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has remained unresolved. From 
this perspective, we have argued that the shallow financial development 
in Georgia can be explained, to a large part, by the ongoing ethnic and civ-
il unrest. We provide further evidence from Sri Lankan experience. Even 
though the nature, dimensions, and the magnitudes of civil conflicts in 
both countries are not alike, their economic consequences are almost simi-
lar. For instance, the CFA between LTTE and the Government of Sri Lan-
ka was associated with expansion of credit and branch network. The CFA 
worked as a confidence building mechanism in the economy and the re-
sulting rise of macroeconomic stability.
Despite the shallow financial system, growth accounting of Georgia 
shows that some specific sectors such as government, construction, and 
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more recently trade are growing amazingly. However, increased govern-
ment expenditure has been financed by central government debt of which 
major portion is external debt. Another dominant source of finance is the 
proceeds received from privatization of state enterprises. Construction is 
another dominant contributing factor to GDP which was financed entirely 
by the FDI. This implies that the drivers for recent economic growth has 
relied less on formal financial system and more on other sources for fi-
nance. But these sources are transitory. Unless Georgian central adminis-
tration looks for a peaceful solution for ethnic and civil crisis and thereby 
boosts its financial system, the quest for sustaining economic growth is 
unlikely to sustain.
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